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Financial constraints are a key determinant that hinders firms' ability to export. This paper analyses the nexus 
between these constraints and firms' engagement in international trade, as well as it explores the impact of the 
European monetary integration process upon firms' financial constraints. Therefore, we estimate cash to cash-flow 
sensitivities for different periods (1996-2000 and 2001-2004) and different groups of firms, according to their ex-
porting and importing activity. Our results indicate that, depending on their international openness, the European 
monetary integration seems to have generally helped reducing the degree of financial constraints faced by Portu-
guese firms. Additionally, our findings suggest that, rather than unconstrained firms self-selecting into exporting, 
firms' constraints were reduced after they started exporting. 
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The causality flow between financial constraints and openness to foreign markets is rather unclear. On one hand, 
open firms may have access to foreign finance and, especially if they are strong exporters, see their domestic 
credit conditions improve. On the other, these firms may only export because they were able to overcome the 
financial constraints barrier. Effectively, there are additional costs to explore foreign markets and the required 
investment may be financially constrained. As a result, only firms that are not financially constrained are able to 
export. 
This paper explores how financial constraints relate to the openness of firms to foreign markets, in particular to 
their exporting and importing activities. Additionally, it evaluates the changes in firms' levels of constraints driven 
by a monetary integration process (the European Common Currency). While we find an inverse relationship be-
tween export intensity and financial constraints, we cast some doubts on the argument stating that only uncon-
strained firms self-select into export behaviour. In fact a priori constrained firms are also able to export and there 
are significant improvements in firms' ability to raise external funds once they start exporting. Furthermore, we 
argue that while in general the monetary integration reduced the constraints faced by Portuguese firms, these 
were affected differently depending on their importing and exporting activities. 
 
After the accession to the European Economic Communities (now the European Union, EU) in 1986, Portugal 
experienced not only the creation of the Common Market in 1992, but most of all the introduction of the Common 
Currency in 2001. The monetary integration that culminated in the Euro brought several changes, of which we 
should point the reduction of interest rates (annualised benchmark interest rate fell from 7.2% in 1996 to 2.1% in 
2004)1 and the promotion of deeper integration of financial markets within the Euro area. Not only could economic 
agents obtain finance in the Euro area cheaper and in an easier manner, but also the leap to a stronger currency 
has eased the access of Portuguese firms to foreign finance. 
 
This paper is the first, to our knowledge, to analyse the effects of the European Monetary Integration on firms' 
ability to raise external funds. Additionally, along with the recent text of Silva (2011b), it is the first to analyse the 
relationship between openness to foreign markets, exports and firms' constraints for Portugal. Furthermore the 
relatively large time span of our unique dataset—albeit our previous works (e.g. Silva and Carreira, 2010), has 
never been used to investigate financial constraints—allows us to compare two distinct periods (before and after 
monetary integration), which, as far as we know, is novel in the analysis of financial constraints at the firm level. 
Nevertheless, we should note that financial constraints have also been analysed by Cabral and Mata (2003) and 
Oliveira and Fortunato (2006) focusing on firm size, with different datasets and very different variables and meth-
odologies—while the first use entrepreneurs' age as a proxy for wealth (ultimately for financial constraints) to ana-
lyse the evolution of firm size distribution, the second estimate employment growth to cash-flow sensitivities and 
interpret these as financial constraints. 
 
                                                 
1 Annualised Euribor and Lisbor at 3 months with adjusted Lisbor by the mean difference in common years (see Appendix for 
details).  





Finally, this paper is of outmost importance for policymaking purposes. On one hand it provides insights on the 
effects that monetary integrations have upon firms financial constraints, which is relevant not only to understand 
the subsequent behaviour of Portuguese firms after the introduction of the Euro, but also for policymakers in coun-
tries now joining the Common Currency. On the other, the clarification of the relationship between constraints, 
degree of openness and, most importantly, export activity, provides further evidence that is crucial to devise the 
adequate incentives to alleviate constraints and ultimately to foster exports. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 makes a brief incursion on the literature on financial constraints, 
firms' exports and monetary integration. In Section 3 we discuss the dataset and variables used. Section 4 de-
scribes the empirical methodology followed, while Section 5 presents the main results. Finally, Section 6 pulls the 
pieces together and concludes. 
 
2. Firms' financial constraints 
2.1. Measuring financial constraints 
The abstract nature of the concept of financial constraints (albeit for subjective firm self-evaluation, it is not directly 
measurable) has challenged researchers, mostly on empirical grounds, to consistently measure constraints. In 
fact, even on theoretical grounds, it is difficult to come up with a clear-cut definition of financial constraints. If on 
one hand, we can broadly say that financial constraints exist whenever there is a wedge between the costs of 
obtaining internal and external funds—following Kaplan and Zingales's (1997) definition that virtually covers every 
firm—, on the other, we prefer to define financial constraints as the inability of a firm to raise the necessary 
amounts (usually due to external finance shortage) to finance their investment and growth. 
 
Despite theoretical literature identifies difficulties in the access of firms to external funds, empirically there is no 
consensus on how to measure financial constraints (see Hubbard, 1998 or Carreira and Silva, 2010 for a discus-
sion). While some authors may resort to the primordial Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) measure of Invest-
ment-Cash Flow Sensitivities (e.g. Bond et al., 2003), others check if parameter restrictions of a derived reduced 
form Euler equation for investment based on Whited (1992) are satisfied (e.g. Harhoff, 1998). 
 
Recently, analyzing firm’s demand for cash, Almeida et al. (2004) advance that the level of financial constraints 
can be measured by the sensitivity of cash to cash-flows (CCFS). They argue that only constrained firms will man-
age liquidity to maximize their value. The rationale behind is that while constrained firms need to save cash out of 
cash flows in order to take advantage of future investment opportunities, unconstrained firms do not, as they are 
able to resort to external finance. Meanwhile, firms that hold cash incur in opportunity costs associated with pre-
sent investment opportunities. As a result, only constrained firms will need to optimize their cash stocks along the 
time, in order to maximize their profits and hedge against future shocks. Therefore, one can expect that estimates 
on the sensitivity of cash stocks to cash-flow would be positive and significant for constrained firms, while no such 
relation should be expected for unconstrained ones. In fact, Hahn (2010) supports that holding liquid assets may  





work as a good hedging policy for firms, when there are imperfections in financial markets. To our knowledge, only 
a few works have used this approach so far (see Silva and Carreira, 2010 for details). 
 
Finally, other strategies include the construction of indexes of variables that are generally agreed to be good prox-
ies of constraints or, if data is available, resort to the subjective firms' self-evaluation of constraints (see Carreira 
and Silva, 2010). 
 
2.2. Financial constraints, trade and monetary integration 
Financial constraints seem to be an important factor to take into account when analysing international trade, as 
suggested, for example, by the theoretical models of Chaney (2005), Manova (2010) and Broll and Wahl (2011). 
These models are based on Melitz (2003), that already recognizes the importance of fixed costs when firms de-
cide to export. However, in such models financial constraints are seen as an exogenous barrier to export, even 
though we provide evidence that firms that start exporting experience a reduction in constraints. Shipping goods 
across countries may entail significant additional costs than selling them in the domestic market, not to mention 
jurisdiction differences between countries (Bekaert and Hodrick, 2008). Even though one should expect a negative 
relationship between financial constraints and exports, it is not clear whether exporting reduces financial con-
straints or unconstrained firms self-select into exporting. On one hand, start exporting may lead to more stable 
cash-flows due to sales diversification, that hedge against demand side shocks (Bridges and Guariglia, 2008). 
Moreover, exporting may signal efficiency to investors (Ganesh-Kumar et al., 2001), not to mention that such firms 
may additionally gain access to foreign finance. On the other hand, firms face significant sunk costs when they 
start exporting, thus financial constraints work as a major barrier to export activity. In fact, Bellone et al. (2010), for 
French firms, find that financial constraints work as an ex-ante barrier to export, since less constrained firms self-
select into exporting behaviour. Examples of this self-selection effect can also be found in Greenway et al. (2007) 
for the UK, Manole and Spatareanu (2010) for the case of Czech firms, Forlani (2010) and Minetti and Zhu (2011) 
for Italian firms or in Berman and Hericourt (2010) for 9 developing and emerging economies. Therefore, if finan-
cial constraints work as a major barrier to export then, in order to foster exports, incentives particularly designed to 
alleviate such constraints are certainly warranted.
2
 Recently, for the Portuguese case, Silva (2011b) analyses 
firms financial condition prior to export and uses an index of constraints based on Bellone et al. (2010) as depend-
ent variable for treatment effects estimation of the impact of exports upon financial constraints. His results support 
that not only there is a self-selection effect, but also that such constraints are reduced once firms engage in ex-
porting activity. 
 
When it comes to financial development and integration, while previous empirical literature, in general, found that it 
alleviates firms' financial constraints (Carreira and Silva, 2010), recent studies analysing the impacts of financial 
crises, put these results into perspective.  As an example, Popov and Ongena (2011), comparing both Western 
and Central with Eastern European countries, find that interbank market integration has reduced the level of con-
                                                 
2 Note that, for the Portuguese case, Silva (2011a), finds that production subsidies neither significantly increase the probability 
that firms start to export nor increase their export intensity, even though production subsidies may not be particularly designed to 
foster exports, as the author argues.  





straints,  especially  in  highly  competitive  banking  sector  markets.  However,  there  were  significant  risks  of 
overleveraging in cases where integration took place at an accelerated pace. Nonetheless, Amiti and Weinstein 
(2009), for Japan, find that financial constraints severely affect exporting activity during financial crisis, while Chor 
and Manova (2011), using US imports data find that, during the recent financial crisis, higher interbank interest 
rates led to lower exports especially for firms in more financially constrained sectors. For the European case, we 
should also stress that monetary integration came along, among others, with the loss monetary policy instruments. 
Still, the levels of financial constraints seem to be lower in bank-based systems (see Carreira and Silva, 2010 for a 
survey or Hernández-Cánovas and Martínez-Solano, 2010 for an example), especially for short-term finance (Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2002). Gorg and Spaliara (2009), comparing firms operating in the UK and France, find that firm 
failure is more sensible to financial variables for firms in the "market-oriented system" of the UK. Additionally, they 
find that continuous export behaviour increases firm survival. 
 
Overall, not only there is still much to be said with respect to the causality flows between financial constraints and 
degree of openness, but also the real benefits of the European monetary integration process are, still nowadays, 
rather unclear and very debatable. Specifically, despite the extensive literature on firm's financial constraints, the 
consequences of such processes upon the ability of firms to raise the necessary amounts to invest, grow and 
export are still to be fully explored. Keeping in mind that no consistent measure of financial constraints has yet 
been developed, we test the following hypothesis: i) Monetary integration alleviates financial constraints and bene-
fits mostly open firms; ii) Financially unconstrained firms self-select into exporting activity. Inferences using this 
sample, representative of Portuguese firms, may be made with respect to, at least, other bank-based economies. 
 
3. Data 
The dataset used in this work was constructed from the combination of Inquérito às Empresas Harmonizado (IEH), 
an annual business survey, and Ficheiro de Unidades Estatísticas (FUE), both collected by the Portuguese Na-
tional Statistical Office (INE). The former dataset comprises information on firms' balance sheets, while resorting to 
the latter, that contains information about firm’s generic characteristics—including size, age and main sector of 
activity—, allows to track firms trough time, thus constructing a large unbalanced panel of firms.
3 
 
For the purpose of this paper the following cleaning procedures were made. First, we eliminated firms with less 
than 20 employees due to the lack of quality of information reported by such firms. Second, we focus only on the 
industry and part of the services sector, thus eliminating the agricultural and financial sectors (the latter would bias 
the estimation favouring unconstrained firms). Observations that were reported either missing or with unreason a-
ble values were dropped.
4 As a result we have a large unbalanced panel of 22.651 firms for the period 1996-2004 
resulting in 86.455 observations. Further details on the construction and description of the variables used are 
available in the Appendix. 
                                                 
3 These two data sources were matched using a code number, also provided by INE, that uniquely identifies each firm for 
different surveys along the successive years. 
4In some specific circumstances, unreasonable values suffered a treatment in order to achieve coherent values. These cases 
include specific observations whose correct values were possible to obtain from other variables or resulting from changes in 
signal mistyping errors.  






The advantage of using this dataset is that it comprises information from firm's balance sheets for the universe of 
firms operating in Portugal with more than 100 employees and a large representative sample of Portuguese firms 
with more than 20 employees. The final dataset is representative of the Portuguese economy, covering all sectors 
and  industries  of  economic  activity  (with  the  exceptions  previously  outlined).  Finally,  the  large  sample  period 
(1996-2004) is sufficient to take into account macroeconomic cyclical variations as well as it covers the monetary 
integration process. 
 
However, a major pitfall of this dataset is the inexistence of market information about firms. Since we only have 
access to a code number of each firm, we are not able to match the dataset with information from, for example, 
stock markets. Still, only a few firms in Portugal are publicly traded (most of them within the financial sector),hence 
the benefits of such extension of the dataset would be negligible. Additionally, information on firms is limited to a 
relatively low level of disaggregation of balance sheets. Finally, by dropping from the database all firms with less 
than 20 employees, we are cutting off a significant number of observations. Even though information on these 
firms lacks in quality and further increases the unbalancedness of the panel, smaller firms would, a priori, be more 
financially constrained (e.g. Cabral and Mata, 2003 or Oliveira and Fortunado, 2006, both for the Portuguese 
case). Consequently, our results might be slightly downward biased when it comes to the level of firms' financial 
distress. Nevertheless, such firms are typically closed (see section 5.1 for the relationship between size and open-
ness), therefore they would not influence the analysis on exporting and importing activities. 
 
4. Methodology 
Almeida et al. (2004) construct an alternative model of liquidity demand and derive an empirical equation to esti-
mate CCFS. The financial nature of the cash stock variable is a shield against missmeasurements in Tobin's Q 
(usual control for investment opportunities) and investment opportunities hidden in cash-flow because it is not 
expected that firms will increase their cash stocks if cash-flow signals a new\better investment opportunity, unless 
they are financially constrained. However, as pointed by Acharya et al (2007), financially constrained firms will only 
use cash to increase cash stocks if hedging needs are high (investment opportunities), otherwise they use cash to 
reduce debt. Therefore, we control both for debt issuances as well as for investment opportunities. Additionally, as 
pointed by Almeida et al. (2011) in a subsequent paper, cash may not be the only way to transfer resources 
across time, since firms may invest in relatively liquid assets, other than cash. As a result, we try to control for this 
effect through investment in non-cash net working capital and financial investments. 
 
Keeping these caveats in mind, we follow of Lin (2007) and we use the sum of net debt and equity issuances 
( ) and interest rate variation instead of the variation of short-term deb. The former modification is due to the 
fact that debt and equity issuances, while being a signal of easier access to external funds, might have a signifi-
cant impact upon cash stocks (by accounting procedures), so we control for such effect. With respect to the latter, 
firms may decide to reduce their borrowings or pay back debt according to expected interest expenses. However, 
instead  of  benchmark  interest  rate  variation,  in  our  baseline  specification  we  use  variations  of  interest  paid  





( ), which allows for firm heterogeneity and thus can also be seen as a form of credit rating. Furthermore, we 
also control for financial investments ( ), that not only are a demand for cash but may also work as an alterna-
tive way to transfer resources across time. In both specifications, all variables are scaled by total assets (except 




where   is the variation in cash stocks of firm i in period t,   the cash-flow,   is a control for firm size (log 
of total assets),   investment,   is the variation of noncash net working capital,   are two-digit industry 
dummies (CAE rev. 2.1) and   the error term. We do not have financial markets information that would allow us 
to compute Tobin's Q. Therefore, we use sales growth ( ) to proxy investment opportunities. This measure is 
often used in empirical work on countries with less developed financial markets where information on firm's market 
value is scarcer (see for eg. Budina et al., 2000 or Konings et al., 2003). Additionally, the use of Tobin's Q is also 
methodologically questionable. Firstly, marginal Q is unobservable, so researchers use average Q as a proxy—
see Hayashi (1981) for the derivation of average Q. Secondly, the introduction of Q directly into the estimation of 
investment models for the purpose of analysing financial constraints may cause the sensitivities to cash-flows to 
be overestimated, as they might contain information about investment opportunities that were not captured by Q—
Alti, 2003, in a model where financial frictions are absent, shows that, even after Q correction, firms exhibit sensi-
tivities to cash-flow. 
 
The financial and investment covariates are endogenous, so we estimate the model using instrumental variables 
(IV\GMM) with fixed effects to take account of unobserved firm-level heterogeneity and panel-robust standard 
errors. The set of instruments includes twice lagged cash flow, twice lagged sales growth, lagged investment, 





In an attempt to capture the effects of monetary and financial integration, we split our sample into two major peri-
ods, before and after integration (i.e. up to 2000 and from 2001 onwards). Even though the integration processes 
is continuous, we pick this breakpoint for two main reasons. First, we only have access to the period 1996-2004, 
consequently, to guarantee a consistent estimation that takes advantage of lagged variables, we must guarantee 
that the subpanels have at least a 3 year depth (preferably 4 year to have a larger number of observations for a 
more efficient estimation).
6 Accordingly, our breakpoint should be either on 1999 or 2000. Second, since the Euro 
was introduced on the 1st January 2001, a landmark for the monetary integration process, we expect that the 
effective possible benefits would be observed from 2001 onwards. Additionally, it is reasonable to expect that the 
                                                 
5 Note that if the methodology is applied to a large number of observations, coefficients are usually found to be statistically 
significant, since the precision of the estimate is higher.However, one should still expect that such coefficients are higher for 
financially constrained groups of firms. Comparison of CCFS estimates with other studies can be found in Silva and Carreira 
(2010). 
6 The limitation of the period of analysis (1996-2004) is due to methodological changes on the collection of data by INE.  





real effects of the potential benefits from the ongoing integration process before 2001 would be subject to a "policy 
lag", therefore only having a significant impact on firms during the subsequent period. As a result, we expect that 
the bulk impact of the integration process would be felt during the period 2001-2004.
7  
 
In order to capture the effects of integration upon financial constraints by different classes of firms , according to 
their degree of openness to foreign markets, we construct a score that identifies firms as closed, open and, within 
open firms, those with low and high levels of openness (see Appendix for further detail).  Consequently, we obtain 
different subsamples of firms depending on their exposure to European markets. Over the period, the EU, on a v-
erage, accounts for 75% of the total exports and 89% of imports. As a result, we focus mainly on the degree of 
openness towards the EU. In fact, the results using a broader definition that covers total exports and imports re-
main unchanged.
8 The same procedure is made with respect to exports and imports, that we then classify as le v-
els of export and import intensity, respectively.  With the purpose of comparing the CCFS estimates across sub-
samples, we compute the confidence intervals  and perform formal  Wald tests
9
. The robustness of the inverse 
relationship between financial constraints, degree of openness, export and import intensities is checked by intro-
ducing interaction terms between cash-flow and these variables (Table A1 in appendix). 
 
Finally, in order to compare firms' constraints before and after shifting into open, exporting or importing activity, we 
group firms that moved from closed to open, started exporting and importing, respectively. We further divide the 
period of time, for each firm, according to the moment they shifted. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Summary statistics 
Table 1a allows us to compare mean values, before and after monetary integration as well as by degree of open-
ness, of the main variables used in the estimation. It is clear that after monetary integration mean variation of cash 
stocks and size (total assets) increased during the period, while mean cash-flow, sales growth, investment, debt 










                                                 
7 Note that this second period not only captures a downward economic cycle, but it also corresponds to higher bilateral exchange 
rates (convergence was before 2001 but effects might be time lagged) which affects the capacity of firms to export and import 
(although very debatable, degree of openness should account for this inverse sign effects). Conversely, the previous period, not 
only captures an economic expansion period, but also carries the effects of the implementation of the Common market in 1992. 
This latter effect is, however, expected to be transversal to the whole period. 
8 Statistics not reported but available from authors upon request. 
9 For simplicity, we omit confidence intervals and test statistics (available from the authors on request) and only report if 
estimates were found to be statistically different or not. 
10 We should note that the economic downturn that came after 2001 may be affecting, to a larger extent some of these variables 
(e.g. exports or sales growth).  





Table 1a: Summary Statistics 
  Period  Degree of Openness 
VARIABLES  1996-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  NO  LOW  HIGH 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  0.002  0.001  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.001 
  (0.062)  (0.064)  (0.061)  (0.070)  (0.055)  (0.059) 
  0.085  0.091  0.081  0.083  0.082  0.089 
  (0.089)  (0.089)  (0.088)  (0.098)  (0.085)  (0.083) 
  0.037  0.073  0.015  0.040  0.041  0.030 
  (0.288)  (0.280)  (0.290)  (0.326)  (0.269)  (0.264) 
  15.539  15.441  15.599  15.074  15.698  15.840 
  (1.448)  (1.508)  (1.406)  (1.508)  (1.476)  (1.237) 
  0.063  0.077  0.054  0.068  0.061  0.060 
  (0.081)  (0.091)  (0.074)  (0.090)  (0.077)  (0.076) 
  -0.048  -0.060  -0.040  -0.051  -0.046  -0.047 
  (0.166)  (0.179)  (0.157)  (0.189)  (0.155)  (0.152) 
  0.035  0.058  0.021  0.036  0.037  0.032 
  (0.209)  (0.218)  (0.203)  (0.227)  (0.201)  (0.198) 
  0.039  0.038  0.040  0.039  0.042  0.036 
  (0.088)  (0.086)  (0.090)  (0.096)  (0.090)  (0.079) 
  -0.001  0.000  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
R  0.030  0.037  0.026       
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.005)       
OPEN  0.125  0.134  0.119       
  (0.175)  (0.180)  (0.171)       
             
Observations  17,283  6,600  10,683  5,757  5,444  6,066 
N. of firms  4,771  2,606  3,333  1,537  1,462  1,632 
Notes:  Mean  values  and  standard  deviations,  given  in  parentheses,  of  the  main  variables  used  in  the 
estimations. Some of the statistics in this table were reported in Silva and Carreira (2011) 
 
Additionally, firms faced a mean decrease in interest paid as well as the mean variation in non cash net working 
capital increased. If instead we compare different levels of openness, it is possible to see that, for the whole peri-
od, differences between less open and highly open firms (columns 5 and 6) are, in general, larger than differences 
between closed and slightly open firms (columns 4 and 5). This indicates that firms with no or a low level of open-
ness appear to be quite similar. However, when we further distinguish between levels of export and import intensi-
ty (Table 1b, columns 1-3 and 4-6, respectively), this pattern is not as clear. While firms with higher levels of both 
import and export intensity are larger and face lower cash stock variation and higher cash-flows (which should be 
expected at least for heavy exporters and might be a sign of lower constraints), intensive exporters are distinct 
from intensive importers when it comes to sales growth. In fact, for higher levels of export intensity firms face lower 
sales growth, the opposite is true for higher levels of import intensity. This is rather puzzling, in particular for the 
case of exporters, since we would expect that sales would increase with higher levels of export intensity, even 
though it may well depend upon economic growth abroad. This odd result is also evident when we compare firms 
before and after they shifted into exporting or importing (columns 7-10).
11 In addition, for both of these groups of 
firms, they face larger cash stocks variation and lower cash-flows, once they shifted, which is in contrast with the 
statistics found for different intensities. 
 
                                                 
11 Nevertheless, this is in line with the downward economic cycle that came after 2001, which, for the Portuguese case, is clear 
from the reduction in sales growth in the second major period of analysis (Table 1a).  





Table  1c  reports  the  Spearman's  correlation  coefficients  for  the  main  variables  used  and  by  different  sub-
periods.
12 Firstly, we should point that the positive association between cash-flow and both changes in cash stocks 
and investment is slightly larger for the first period, which may provide the first insights on possible differ ences in 
CCFS (as well as ICFS).
13 Secondly, we should highlight that whereas in the first period there is a significant posi-
tive correlation between the benchmark interest rate and sales growth, this association is negative and significant 
in the second period (which may well result from  the economic cycle), while the correlation between benchmark 
interest rate and cash-stock variation is only significantly negative for the first period. This latter pattern is also 
verified when it comes to the correlation between exports and both cash sto ck variation and sales growth. Addi-
tionally, there is a strong positive association between size and both export and import intensity suggesting that 
larger firms are those that export and import the most, which is not unexpected.
14 Furthermore, the extremely high 
and significant correlation between import and export intensities is also as expected and indicates that defining 
degree of openness as the combination of both is sensible. Finally, the positive correlation between cash-flow and 
both export and import intensity is higher and  strongly significant for the second period, pointing to potentially 
larger benefits for international firms after the Monetary integration. 
                                                 
12 We avoid using Pearson's correlation coefficients due to the non-normality of a large number of variables. 
13 We test the alternative ICFS methodology and in fact results point to larger sensitivities in the first period (0.61 against  0.23, 
significant at 5% level). Statistics not reported but available from authors on request. 
14 In fact, the correlation between size (total assets) and degree of openness is positive, high and statistically significant.  The 
same is true if instead of total assets we use number of employees as a measure of size (spearman's rho is 0.23
*). Furthermore, 
for different size classes (with thresholds at 50, 100 and 250 employees) the mean degree of openness is 0.07, 0.11, 0.16 and 
0.17 for small, medium-small, medium-large and large firms, respectively.  






Table 1b: Summary Statistics 
  Export intensity  Import intensity  Export shifting  Import shifting 
VARIABLES  NO  LOW  HIGH  NO  LOW  HIGH  Before  After  Before  After 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
  0.004  0.003  0.000  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.003  0.000  0.003 
  (0.067)  (0.055)  (0.058)  (0.069)  (0.057)  (0.058)  (0.057)  (0.055)  (0.058)  (0.056) 
  0.083  0.085  0.088  0.081  0.083  0.091  0.094  0.085  0.089  0.081 
  (0.095)  (0.081)  (0.084)  (0.096)  (0.085)  (0.082)  (0.086)  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.084) 
  0.045  0.033  0.027  0.036  0.037  0.038  0.066  0.035  0.051  0.024 
  (0.313)  (0.261)  (0.266)  (0.323)  (0.271)  (0.256)  (0.292)  (0.271)  (0.272)  (0.279) 
  15.226  15.817  15.809  15.106  15.663  15.947  15.724  15.818  15.827  15.793 
  (1.540)  (1.302)  (1.301)  (1.496)  (1.450)  (1.229)  (1.413)  (1.414)  (1.469)  (1.434) 
  0.067  0.056  0.062  0.066  0.060  0.062  0.074  0.054  0.067  0.056 
  (0.089)  (0.075)  (0.074)  (0.088)  (0.076)  (0.077)  (0.092)  (0.072)  (0.079)  (0.079) 
  -0.050  -0.039  -0.051  -0.050  -0.049  -0.044  -0.053  -0.039  -0.048  -0.047 
  (0.181)  (0.148)  (0.154)  (0.187)  (0.154)  (0.149)  (0.175)  (0.168)  (0.169)  (0.167) 
  0.040  0.034  0.028  0.035  0.033  0.037  0.060  0.026  0.044  0.024 
  (0.222)  (0.194)  (0.200)  (0.226)  (0.202)  (0.194)  (0.222)  (0.197)  (0.230)  (0.197) 
  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001 
  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.006) 
  0.040  0.037  0.040  0.039  0.043  0.036  0.042  0.049  0.048  0.049 
  (0.094)  (0.082)  (0.084)  (0.094)  (0.091)  (0.078)  (0.092)  (0.105)  (0.100)  (0.108) 
                     
Observations  8,039  4,315  4,913  6,652  5,066  5,550  990  990  1,302  1,302 
N. of firms  2,210  1,144  1,333  1,782  1,374  1,523  300  300  397  397 
Notes: Mean values and standard deviations, given in parentheses, of the main variables used in the estimations.  
    





Table 1c: Spearman's rank correlation coefficients for the different periods 
1996-2004    CF    S  I    ISS      R  Export  Import  Open 
  1.000                         
CF  0.0830*  1.000                       
  0.1185*  0.2395*  1.000                     
S  -0.0012  -0.0539*  0.0386*  1.000                   
I  -0.0274*  0.3205*  0.1594*  -0.0189  1.000                 
  -0.2525*  0.0051  0.0248*  0.0518*  -0.2827*  1.000               
ISS  0.1105*  -0.1433*  0.1740*  0.0437*  0.2043*  0.003  1.000             
  -0.0089  -0.0742*  0.1246*  0.0164  0.0876*  0.0354*  0.2125*  1.000           
  -0.0218*  -0.0736*  -0.0324*  0.4043*  -0.0404*  -0.0135  0.0065  -0.0019  1.000         
R  -0.0307*  0.0360*  0.0888*  -0.0514*  0.1318*  -0.0377*  0.0598*  0.1180*  -0.0054  1.000       
Export  -0.0202  0.0492*  -0.0254*  0.2135*  0.0260*  -0.0028  -0.0188  -0.0340*  0.0817*  0.0121  1.000     
Import  -0.0101  0.0507*  0.0131  0.2876*  0.0130  0.0303*  0.0009  -0.0199  0.0819*  0.0232*  0.5501*  1.000   
Open  -0.0170  0.0477*  -0.0092  0.2581*  0.0145  0.0175  -0.0083  -0.0281*  0.0761*  0.0239*  0.8256*  0.8619*  1.000 
1996-2000                           
  1.000                         
CF  0.0896*  1.000                       
  0.1277*  0.2170*  1.000                     
S  -0.0158  -0.0619*  0.0426*  1.000                   
I  -0.0170  0.3496*  0.1211*  -0.0216  1.000                 
  -0.2372*  -0.0336*  0.0284  0.0671*  -0.3055*  1.000               
ISS  0.1087*  -0.1491*  0.1596*  0.0736*  0.1926*  0.0616*  1.000             
  -0.0196  -0.0828*  0.1289*  0.0327*  0.0727*  -0.0073  0.2039*  1.000           
  -0.0192  -0.0599*  -0.0265  0.4242*  -0.0338*  0.0030  0.0189  0.0064  1.000         
R  -0.0700*  -0.0241  0.0564*  0.0202  -0.0244  0.0549*  0.0073  0.3142*  0.0005  1.000       
Export  -0.0386*  0.0374*  -0.0544*  0.2311*  0.0341*  0.0018  -0.0128  -0.0258  0.0653*  -0.0178  1.000     
Import  -0.0254  0.0248  0.0062  0.3251*  0.0099  0.0445*  0.0158  -0.0013  0.0925*  0.0004  0.5372*  1.000   
Open  -0.0386*  0.0245  -0.0334*  0.2862*  0.0128  0.0286  0.0014  -0.0149  0.0720*  -0.0091  0.8264*  0.8536*  1.000 
2001-2004                           
  1.000                         
CF  0.0766*  1.000                       
  0.1115*  0.2462*  1.000                     
S  0.0131  -0.0372*  0.0587*  1.000                   
I  -0.0362*  0.2822*  0.1487*  0.0098  1.000                 
  -0.2698*  0.0540*  0.0419*  0.0270  -0.2460*  1.000               
ISS  0.1135*  -0.1520*  0.1671*  0.0285  0.1892*  0.0215  1.000             
  0.0055  -0.0747*  0.1088*  0.0065  0.0872*  -0.0144  0.2191*  1.000           
  -0.0243  -0.0850*  -0.0349*  0.3846*  -0.0442*  0.0009  -0.0030  -0.0086  1.000         
R  -0.0207  -0.0143  -0.1026*  -0.0165  0.0263  -0.0287  -0.0152  -0.0829*  0.0113  1.000       
Export  -0.0015  0.0573*  -0.0050  0.2009*  0.0101  -0.0032  -0.0308*  -0.0458*  0.0984*  -0.0013  1.000     
Import  0.0049  0.0717*  0.0138  0.2550*  0.0065  0.0194  -0.0185  -0.0416*  0.0724*  0.0208  0.5619*  1.000   
Open  0.0044  0.0658*  0.0057  0.2361*  0.0051  0.0106  -0.0245  -0.0450*  0.0809*  0.0161  0.8248*  0.8693*  1.000 
Notes: Rank correlation coefficients were calculated using Sidak's adjustment. * denotes statistical significance at the .01 level    





5.2. Monetary integration 
Portuguese firms, during the period 1996-2004 were, on average, financially constrained. Table 2 shows that 
before monetary integration firms saved, on average, 25 cents out of each euro of cash flow, meanwhile after 
integration the CCFS was reduced to 0.183 (first line of columns 2 and 3, respectively). A formal Wald test 
rejects the hypothesis that the CCFS coefficient after integration is the same as before integration, at the 95% 
level. If we abstain from controlling for the money market, the difference in CCFS is also large and statistically 
significant (columns 6 and 7).
15 Noteworthy differences are also found with respect to the impact of sales 
growth, size, debt and equity issuances and interest payments variations in the  cash policy of firms. The Euro 
landmark is further emphasized if year dummies are introduced (column 1). Even though a comparison b e-
tween the two periods with year dummies is not econometrically feasible, in a regression over the whole period 
1996-2004, only the dummy corresponding to 2000 is statistically significant.
16 This may indicate that in this 
particular year there were changes that significantly affected firms' cash policy. Alternatively, if we control for 
the evolution of the benchmark interest rate (columns 4 and 5), it is possible to observe that not only the CCFS 
difference between periods is much lower (and not statistically significant), but also that there is a huge diffe r-
ence in the impact of the benchmark interest rate between periods (negative for the first period and not differ-
ent from zero in the second).
17
 This result indicates that the evolution of interest rates (fell from 7.2% in 1996 
to 2.1% in 2004), that mirrors the integration process, were an important determinant of firms' cash po licy. 
Therefore, even if firms anticipated this effect, it helps in explaining the differences in CCFS between periods 
(columns 2-3 and 6-7) and supports the analysis distinguishing each period. 
 
5.3. Exporting and importing 
As expected, Table 3 shows that there might be an inverse relationship between the degree of openness to 
foreign markets and financial constraints since, for the whole period, the higher the openness, the lower is the 
CCFS (columns 1-3 report the CCFS estimates that are all statistically different). This result may arise either 
because more open firms may have better access to foreign finance or only unconstrained firms are able to 
exploit foreign markets. 
 
Interestingly, when we split the sample by the two major periods, we find a reduction in constraints for open 
firms (columns 6 and 7), while the level of financial distress of closed firms remains mostly unchanged (col-
umns 4 and 5). However, depending on the degree of openness, firms' financial constraints were either re-
duced (columns 10 and 11) or, if not equal (estimates in columns 8 and 9 are not statistically different), were 
amplified. This is a puzzling result since we would expect, a priori, that even though the reduction in constraints  
                                                 
15 Silva and Carreira (2010) refer to a few benchmark CCFS coefficients from other studies. 
16 The use of lagged variables both as independent \endogenous variables and instruments imposes that a number of year 
dummies must be dropped due to collinearity. However, we tested simpler regressions and results do not differ substantially. 
Namely, either d5 (2000) is the only significant dummy (always at 1% level) or dummies corresponding to previous years are 
slightly significant (at either 5% or 10% levels), while 2000 remains the most significant. 
17 Note that the introduction of the benchmark interest rate, that is common to all firms —even though in practice firms are 
able to negotiate  with banks\lenders their own interest  rate  (the reason to  use interest paid)—implies that neither  year 
dummies nor interest paid can be used in the estimation.  






Table 2:CCFS estimation with different controls for money market 
  Year dummy  Baseline estimation  Benchmark interest rate (R)  No controls for money market 
VARIABLES  1996-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  0.185***  0.245***  0.184***  0.221***  0.190***  0.245***  0.188*** 
  (0.017)  (0.037)  (0.027)  (0.037)  (0.027)  (0.037)  (0.027) 
  0.015***  0.020***  0.011**  0.021***  0.010**  0.019***  0.010** 
  (0.003)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.004) 
  0.015***  0.028**  0.043***  0.042***  0.040***  0.023*  0.040*** 
  (0.004)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.008) 
  -0.220***  -0.241***  -0.241***  -0.244***  -0.242***  -0.237***  -0.243*** 
  (0.012)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.022)  (0.017) 
  -0.149***  -0.155***  -0.159***  -0.148***  -0.161***  -0.151***  -0.161*** 
  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.009) 
  0.079***  0.103***  0.071***  0.095***  0.071***  0.102***  0.071*** 
  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.006) 
  -0.130***  -0.252***  -0.235***  -0.241***  -0.237***  -0.243***  -0.237*** 
  (0.017)  (0.048)  (0.030)  (0.047)  (0.030)  (0.048)  (0.030) 
  -0.214**  -0.205  -0.364**         
  (0.094)  (0.157)  (0.143)         
R        -0.734***  -0.100     
        (0.129)  (0.128)     
1999  -0.002             
  (0.002)             
2000  -0.009***             
  (0.002)             
2002  -0.001             
  (0.002)             
2003  0.001             
  (0.002)             
               
Observations  15,277  5,212  8,756  5,212  8,756  5,212  8,756 
N. of firms  4,771  2,606  3,333  2,606  3,333  2,606  3,333 
R-squared  0.184  0.212  0.201  0.224  0.199  0.211  0.199 
Hansen p-val.  0.289  0.393  0.134  0.282  0.0976  0.312  0.0912 
Notes: Regression of equation (1) as baseline estimation (columns 2 and 3). In column (1) we introduce year dummies, while in columns (4) and (5) 
we use the benchmark interest rate (R). In columns (6) and (7) we omit both   and R. All regressions include two-digit industry dummies (CAE 
rev.2.1). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Tables with 
confidence intervals and further test statistics available from the authors on request. Some of the statistics in this table were reported in Silva and 
Carreira (2011)  
    






Table 3:CCFS estimation by openness towards the EU 
OPENNESS  NO  LOW  HIGH  NO  YES  LOW  HIGH 
PERIOD  1996-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
  0.269***  0.173***  0.107***  0.284***  0.272***  0.208***  0.151***  0.167**  0.221***  0.240***  0.110*** 
  (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.027)  (0.062)  (0.056)  (0.047)  (0.032)  (0.068)  (0.049)  (0.065)  (0.043) 
  0.018***  0.011**  0.014***  0.031**  0.012*  0.015*  0.008  0.022*  0.004  0.009  0.013* 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.007) 
  0.018**  0.018***  0.025***  0.025  0.032**  0.026*  0.059***  -0.010  0.055***  0.048**  0.070*** 
  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.024)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.022)  (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.012) 
  -0.252***  -0.200***  -0.222***  -0.263***  -0.266***  -0.224***  -0.243***  -0.161***  -0.234***  -0.251***  -0.260*** 
  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.019)  (0.042)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.020)  (0.044)  (0.036)  (0.040)  (0.027) 
  -0.166***  -0.134***  -0.161***  -0.168***  -0.177***  -0.148***  -0.163***  -0.137***  -0.150***  -0.166***  -0.182*** 
  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.017) 
  0.080***  0.078***  0.076***  0.108***  0.069***  0.098***  0.075***  0.107***  0.076***  0.092***  0.067*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.011) 
  -0.484***  -0.081  -0.552***  -0.082  -0.685**  -0.301  -0.196  0.186  0.071  -0.704**  -0.492** 
  (0.177)  (0.144)  (0.168)  (0.306)  (0.285)  (0.202)  (0.156)  (0.266)  (0.218)  (0.312)  (0.229) 
  -0.198***  -0.116***  -0.107***  -0.404***  -0.286***  -0.246***  -0.242***  -0.215***  -0.264***  -0.305***  -0.221*** 
  (0.046)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.100)  (0.083)  (0.055)  (0.033)  (0.077)  (0.062)  (0.081)  (0.037) 
                       
Observations  4,299  4,163  5,173  1,274  2,497  3,400  5,502  1,282  2,340  1,802  2,789 
N. of firms  1,537  1,462  1,632  637  1,008  1,700  2,160  641  960  901  1,093 
R-squared  0.221  0.180  0.180  0.265  0.235  0.199  0.211  0.202  0.207  0.212  0.236 
Hansen p-val.  0.251  0.200  0.729  0.268  0.182  0.930  0.514  0.986  0.540  0.621  0.477 
Notes: Regression of equation (1). Firms’ openness score definition in Appendix. All regressions include two-digit industry dummies (CAE rev.2.1). Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Tables with confidence intervals and further test statistics available from the 
authors on request. Some of the statistics in this table were reported in Silva and Carreira (2011)    





should be larger for highly open firms, firms with lower levels of openness should also exhibit a reduction in 
constraints, given that monetary integration should benefit mostly those firms that also have businesses over-
seas (through exchange rate stability and access to foreign both banks and financial markets). Additional dif-
ferences arise between firms with low and high levels of openness, with respect to the impacts of sales growth, 
investment and variation of interest paid. We also tested the inclusion of real GDP growth or unemployment, in 
order to capture possible influences of the economic cycle, nevertheless the results remain very similar. Re-
sults remain unchanged if we additionally control for the benchmark interest rate, number of employees or age 
or even if, instead of degree of openness-EU, we use total degree of openness.
18 
 
These results indicate that while highly open firms benefited the most with the integration, closed firms exper i-
enced no changes with respect to constraints and, most interestingly, slightly open firms faced, if not the same, 
higher constraints in the second period. This odd result arises for firms that have very small degrees of ope n-
ness—smaller than 0.5%, while for firms between 0.5% and 1% the results are as previously hypothesised.
19 
This might, however, be associated with larger competition for funds in the integrated markets, since firms with 
low degrees of openness might not be as visible abroad as they would be in the domestic market,  while at the 
same time, losing their advantage on the domestic market, where lenders will then opt to finance domestic or 
even foreign firms with better prospects. In fact, if we compare the level of constraints of these firms with those 
of closed firms, the difference in CCFS estimates is larger for the initial period than for the second period. One 
could argue that lenders would no longer distinguish between slightly open and closed firms. 
 
If instead we look at firm export and import activity separately,  we see that firms with higher export or import 
intensities are less financially constrained, as expected, even though the pattern is clearer for the case of e x-
ports—while for exports (Table 4, columns 1-3) all estimates are statistically different, for the case of imports 
(Table 5, columns 1-3), high intensity estimates are not statistically different from those of lower intensity. 
However, when we compare the levels of constraints before and after monetary integration, distinct patterns 
arise. While no significant differences between periods are found for firms that either imported or not (Table 5, 
columns 4-7), firms that either exported or not (Table 4, columns 4-7) seem to have experienced a slight reduc-
tion in constraints with integration (a formal Wald test only rejects that the coefficients are statistically equal at 
the 90% level), despite the levels of constraints for non-exporting firms in the second period is much larger 
than those of exporting firms in the first period (Table 4, columns 5 and 6, respectively).
20 
 
                                                 
18 Statistics not reported but available from authors upon request. 
19 Statistics not reported but available from authors upon request. 
20 Note that the reduction in constraints for non-exporting firms, even though apparently unexpected, goes in line with the 
general findings in section 5.2.  






Table 4:CCFS estimation by export intensity-EU 
EXPORT  NO  LOW  HIGH  NO  YES  LOW  HIGH 
PERIOD  1996-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
  0.271***  0.135***  0.062**  0.313***  0.269***  0.151***  0.099***  0.186*  0.119**  0.130**  0.098** 
  (0.027)  (0.036)  (0.027)  (0.059)  (0.041)  (0.047)  (0.035)  (0.106)  (0.056)  (0.051)  (0.045) 
  0.014***  0.010  0.015***  0.030***  0.009  0.017**  0.015***  0.030**  0.005  0.006  0.021*** 
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.014)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.008) 
  0.016***  0.021**  0.019***  0.013  0.043***  0.040**  0.042***  0.077***  0.014  0.044**  0.052*** 
  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.024)  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.015) 
  -0.253***  -0.210***  -0.174***  -0.253***  -0.271***  -0.235***  -0.203***  -0.275***  -0.211***  -0.212***  -0.200*** 
  (0.018)  (0.024)  (0.020)  (0.036)  (0.026)  (0.031)  (0.021)  (0.048)  (0.032)  (0.039)  (0.028) 
  -0.158***  -0.155***  -0.142***  -0.158***  -0.167***  -0.159***  -0.156***  -0.164***  -0.170***  -0.156***  -0.156*** 
  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.020)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.017) 
  0.086***  0.087***  0.063***  0.111***  0.079***  0.100***  0.064***  0.109***  0.081***  0.087***  0.047*** 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.011) 
  -0.420***  -0.385**  -0.359**  -0.039  -0.553**  -0.381*  -0.449**  -0.748**  -0.373  -0.258  -0.333 
  (0.139)  (0.186)  (0.169)  (0.241)  (0.223)  (0.222)  (0.177)  (0.352)  (0.254)  (0.292)  (0.235) 
  -0.162***  -0.161***  -0.079**  -0.241***  -0.321***  -0.322***  -0.190***  -0.369***  -0.207***  -0.294***  -0.181*** 
  (0.032)  (0.035)  (0.032)  (0.075)  (0.061)  (0.071)  (0.030)  (0.088)  (0.049)  (0.101)  (0.042) 
                       
Observations  6,475  3,293  4,299  1,984  3,804  2,762  4,333  1,022  1,833  1,580  2,280 
N. of firms  2,210  1,144  1,333  992  1,500  1,381  1,689  511  742  790  884 
R-squared  0.212  0.210  0.154  0.241  0.231  0.225  0.194  0.282  0.218  0.202  0.188 
Hansen p-val.  0.228  0.509  0.728  0.173  0.665  0.875  0.633  0.791  0.237  0.782  0.819 
Notes: Regression of equation (1). Firms’ export intensity scores definition in Appendix. All regressions include two-digit industry dummies (CAE rev.2.1). Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Tables with confidence intervals and further test statistics available from 
the authors on request.    






Table 5:CCFS estimation by import intensity-EU 
IMPORT  NO  LOW  HIGH  NO  YES  LOW  HIGH 
PERIOD  1996-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004  1996-2000  2001-2004 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
  0.259***  0.142***  0.118***  0.278***  0.271***  0.192***  0.168***  0.078  0.211***  0.307***  0.126*** 
  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.030)  (0.061)  (0.053)  (0.051)  (0.034)  (0.066)  (0.053)  (0.092)  (0.047) 
  0.017***  0.014**  0.005  0.033***  0.010  0.016*  0.008  0.017  0.008  0.009  0.003 
  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.014)  (0.008) 
  0.017**  0.018***  0.020***  0.017  0.032**  0.032**  0.061***  0.009  0.054***  0.071***  0.052*** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.023)  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.010)  (0.023)  (0.013)  (0.024)  (0.015) 
  -0.248***  -0.176***  -0.253***  -0.238***  -0.264***  -0.245***  -0.242***  -0.135***  -0.251***  -0.280***  -0.263*** 
  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.019)  (0.041)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.022)  (0.049)  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.028) 
  -0.159***  -0.132***  -0.167***  -0.165***  -0.172***  -0.150***  -0.168***  -0.145***  -0.143***  -0.147***  -0.192*** 
  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.023)  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.018) 
  0.077***  0.066***  0.091***  0.103***  0.067***  0.095***  0.075***  0.098***  0.067***  0.095***  0.095*** 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.009)  (0.020)  (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.012) 
  -0.483***  -0.166  -0.267  -0.118  -0.623**  -0.369*  -0.273  -0.044  -0.041  -0.663*  -0.216 
  (0.165)  (0.151)  (0.177)  (0.290)  (0.266)  (0.219)  (0.167)  (0.254)  (0.238)  (0.382)  (0.257) 
  -0.188***  -0.102***  -0.117***  -0.305***  -0.272***  -0.267***  -0.232***  -0.172***  -0.257***  -0.379***  -0.204*** 
  (0.042)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.104)  (0.070)  (0.058)  (0.035)  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.084)  (0.038) 
                       
Observations  4,925  3,865  4,614  1,426  2,845  3,076  4,977  1,142  2,109  1,532  2,461 
N. of firms  1,782  1,374  1,523  713  1,156  1,538  1,967  571  871  766  984 
R-squared  0.212  0.155  0.192  0.250  0.225  0.194  0.211  0.182  0.193  0.240  0.231 
Hansen p-val.  0.341  0.241  0.857  0.337  0.209  0.999  0.531  0.632  0.988  0.479  0.126 
Notes: Regression of equation (1). Firms’ import intensity scores definition in Appendix. All regressions include two-digit industry dummies (CAE rev.2.1). Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Tables with confidence intervals and further test statistics available from 
the authors on request.    





If we further distinguish between low and high levels of export and import intensities, we find a clear contrast 
between these firms. Whereas for high export intensity firms, financial constraints levels remain unchanged at 
low levels (estimates in columns 10 and 11 of Table 4 are not statistically different), high intensity importers 
experienced a clear reduction in constraints (Table 5, columns 10 and 11). These results suggest that firms 
that rely mostly on imports accrued larger benefits from integration than did export driven firms. This may arise 
because the former saw their credit conditions improved overseas, while the latter already benefited from a 
privileged position before integration, corroborated by the CCFS estimates for the first period (Table 5, column 
10). Conversely, while there is a clear increase in financial constraints for firms with lower import intensities 
(Table 5, columns 8 and 9), the level of constraints for firms with low export intensity, if not lower, remains 
practically unchanged in the second period (Table 4, columns 8 and 9 report CCFS estimates that are not 
statistically different). This result clarifies the higher CCFS, after integration, found for firms with lower degree 
of openness, provided it is due to an higher contribution of importing firms rather than exporting ones. 
 
In order to verify if firms' constraints were actually reduced with shifting, there is no longer a point in analysing 
firm openness, since if a firm starts importing, even though there might be a constraints alleviating effect due to 
relationships established abroad, the opposite effect might be larger due to a possible necessity of importing 
goods (either machinery or raw materials) that boosts the demand for cash (this pattern is clear from the com-
parison of columns 5 and 6 in Table 6). However, if we look at firms that started exporting, it is clear that the 
self-selection effect (financial constraints barrier) is not as large as the benefits accruing from access to better 
finance either abroad or at home, as we can see from the comparison of the estimates from columns 4 and 5 
(CCFS coefficients dropped from 0.265 to 0.145 and are statistically different). If instead estimates on CCFS 
before and after starting to export would be similar, then this would suggest that less constrained firms would 
self-select into exporting.
21 These results are confirmed if, instead of splitting the sample, we interact cash-flow 
with a binary indicator for the shifting status—before and after shifting (Table A1 in appendix). Nevertheless, 
even after starting to export, these firms still face significant constraints as they save, on average, 15 cents out 
of each extra euro of cash-flow. Finally, the fact that, on average, firms before starting to export present high 
CCFS (they save 27 cents out of each euro of extra cash-flow), casts serious doubts on the hypothesis that 
only unconstrained firms self-select into exporting activity. 
 
                                                 
21 We should note that there is a significant reduction in the number of firms from the samples corresponding to the periods 
before shifting to those after shifting, which results from the estimator used, that requires at least 3 periods of observations 
for consistent estimation. This means that if a firm shifted in 1997 we will not have sufficient years to estimate the CCFS 
"before shifting", while such firm will appear in the "after shifting" CCFS estimation. To tackle this issue, we only estimate 
"after shifting" CCFS for those firms whose "before shifting" CCFS was feasible. Accordingly we have a smaller subsample of 
firms for which results are indeed comparable.  






Table 6:CCFS for shifting firms 
  OPEN  EXPORT  IMPORT 
VARIABLES  Before  After  Before  After  Before  After 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  0.155*  0.178**  0.265***  0.145**  0.060  0.211*** 
  (0.090)  (0.074)  (0.094)  (0.063)  (0.061)  (0.062) 
  0.025*  0.015  0.018  0.013  0.011  0.016* 
  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.009) 
  0.024  0.004  0.013  0.025  0.010  -0.002 
  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.013)  (0.015) 
  -0.201***  -0.182***  -0.222***  -0.186***  -0.198***  -0.189*** 
  (0.050)  (0.038)  (0.044)  (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.036) 
  -0.130***  -0.138***  -0.152***  -0.137***  -0.135***  -0.153*** 
  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.026)  (0.021) 
  0.036**  0.088***  0.083***  0.070***  0.043***  0.087*** 
  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.016) 
  -0.145  -0.221  0.072  -0.023  0.036  0.098 
  (0.294)  (0.392)  (0.279)  (0.393)  (0.287)  (0.367) 
  -0.160***  -0.198**  -0.152***  -0.219**  -0.171**  -0.116 
  (0.059)  (0.101)  (0.041)  (0.087)  (0.068)  (0.090) 
             
Observations  788  788  731  731  942  942 
N. of firms  330  330  300  300  397  397 
R-squared  0.183  0.215  0.222  0.214  0.179  0.233 
Hansen p-val.  0.528  0.887  0.947  0.493  0.636  0.985 
Notes:  Regression  of  equation  (1)  for  groups  of  firms  that  moved  from  closed  to  open,  started  exporting  those  that  started  importing. All 
regressions  include  two-digit  industry  dummies  (CAE  rev.2.1).    Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  ***,  **,  and  *  denote  statistical 
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Tables with confidence intervals and further test statistics available from the authors 
upon request 
  





6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we investigate the extent to which the monetary integration phenomena has influenced firms' financial 
distress as well as the impact of financial constraints upon firms with different exporting and importing activities. 
 
Our main findings suggest that the constraints alleviating effect seems to be stronger than the financial constraints 
barrier, further adding to the literature on financial constraints and exports. This result has important policy implica-
tions regarding firms' exports. On one hand, financially constrained firms will not require financial support to such a 
large extent, since they are able to start exporting and will benefit from lower constraints once they start to export. 
On the other hand, incentives to export (financial or not) will have an additional positive effect upon firm's financial 
position and access to finance, once firms engage into effective exporting activity, meaning that such incentives are 
desirable. 
 
Additionally, we find that financial and monetary integration has, in general, helped in reducing firms' financial con-
straints. However, this process, while benefiting mostly firms that were highly open and specifically those that were 
heavy importers, it harmed firms with lower openness and had no substantial effect upon firms that relied solely on 
their domestic market. Nevertheless, this effect was driven by importing firms. Overall, these results show that the 
integration process had a positive impact by easing firms access to finance abroad and reducing the price of mon-
ey in domestic markets, therefore reducing constraints (for the Portuguese case, notwithstanding the results might 
be generalisable to at least other European economies). 
 
Further research should aim at extending this analysis to a wider time span, particularly covering the recent finan-
cial crisis, as well as at comparing the level of constraints for exporting firms across different economies. 
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Appendix: Construction of variables 
Size (S): Computed as log inflation-adjusted assets (deflation through the GDP deflator) 
Investment (I | invest): Measured as additions to plant, property and equipment- gross investment. 
Output (Y | y): Measured as total sales and services. 
Cash- flow (CF | cf): Computed as net income before taxes plus depreciation. 
Cash stock (CS | cs): Measured as total cash holdings. 
Investment Opportunities ( Y |  y): Since we do not have financial markets information that would allow us to 
compute Tobin's Q, we use the first difference of sales to proxy for investment opportunities. 
Debt and equity issuances (ISS): Sum of debt and equity issuances. For the year 2001 equity issuances are 
reported as missing. The reason lies in legal changes that took place with the introduction of the Euro (most firms 
adjusted their equity not necessarily meaning issuing equity). 
Non-cash net working capital (NWK | nwk): Difference between non-cash current assets and current liabilities. 
Variation of interest paid ( ): Variation of interest paid by firms, that may also reflect a firm-specific rating, 
scaled by total assets. 
Financial investments ( ): Firms' financial investments, scaled by total assets. 
Benchmark  interest  rate  (R): Annualised  Euribor  and  Lisbor  at  3  months  with  adjusted  Lisbor  by  the  mean 
difference in common years. We needed to compute our own series by joining two series made available by Banco 
de Portugal (Euribor for the period after the introduction of the Euro and Lisbor for the period before). The same 
change  in  monetary  policy  decision  making,  that  accompanied  the  introduction  of  the  Euro  led  to  significant 
difficulties in finding comparable benchmark interest rates for the periods before and after 2000. Accordingly we 
focus on the interbank interest rate. Additionally we focus on the 3 months rate in order to avoid capturing the 
expectations incorporated in longer period rates. such as 1 year. 
Degree of openness to foreign markets (OPEN): Score that captures the degree of openness of firms to foreign 
markets that in its turn is obtained by the sum of export and import intensity (normalized by sales) divided by 2. A 
firm scores 1 (no) if it is closed and 4 (yes) if open. Scores 2 (low) and 3 (high) are obtained by dividing open firms 
(score 4) at the mean degree of openness. Initially we divided firms into terciles by their degree of openness, 
however the use of terciles implies that a significant number of non exporting\importing firms are included in the 
second tercile (about 40% of firms rely solely on the domestic market). 
Export intensity (EXP): Total exports to the EU divided by total sales. Export intensity scores are obtained in the 
same manner as openness scores (described above). 
Import intensity (IMP): Total imports from the EU divided by total sales. Import intensity scores are obtained in the 
same manner as openness scores (described above). 
 
All variables of interest were winsorized at 1% level in order to avoid problems with outliers in the estimation 
procedures. Deflators used include the Industrial Production Price Index and Labour Cost Index, both drawn from 
INE, and the GDP deflator, drawn from the Portuguese Central Bank (BdP). Nevertheless, no deflators were used 
when a variable was constructed as a ratio of two nominal values (normalized). In such cases we assume that the 
price growth rates are homogeneous. All variables in low caps result from a normalization procedure (the variable  





of  interest  is  divided  by  total  assets).  Real  GDP  growth  (Euro  16  area)  as  well  as  unemployment  rates  were 
obtained from Eurostat. 
 
The data is representative, at the sectoral and industrial levels, of the Portuguese economy. We have information 
on the disaggregated CAE rev. 2.1 industrial classification at the 5-digit level (Portuguese classification system). All 
industries are present in the dataset, even though we exclude the agricultural sector and the financial services 
industry for reasons explained in section 3. 
 
Table A1: Financial constraints, openness, exports and imports using interactions 
VARIABLES  Open  Export  Import  Export shift 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  0.207***  0.207***  0.198***  0.238*** 
  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.049) 
  0.001       
  (0.011)       
  -0.249***       
  (0.074)       
    0.006     
    (0.007)     
    -0.159***     
    (0.043)     
      0.001   
      (0.008)   
      -0.199***   
      (0.066)   
        0.014*** 
        (0.005) 
        -0.113*** 
        (0.039) 
  0.014***  0.014***  0.014***  0.010 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
  0.017***  0.017***  0.017***  0.013 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.008) 
  -0.222***  -0.223***  -0.221***  -0.194*** 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.026) 
  -0.150***  -0.150***  -0.150***  -0.128*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.015) 
  0.078***  0.078***  0.078***  0.069*** 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.010) 
  -0.338***  -0.336***  -0.333***  0.065 
  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.188) 
  -0.129***  -0.129***  -0.128***  -0.104*** 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.031) 
         
Observations  15,259  15,259  15,260  1,773 
N. of firms  4,765  4,765  4,765  514 
R-squared  0.183  0.183  0.183  0.170 
Hansen p-val.  0.218  0.229  0.222  0.534 
Notes:  Regression  of  equation  (1)  with  interaction  terms  for  cash-flow  and  degree  of  openness, 
export intensity and import intensity (columns 1-3, respectively), as well as with a binary indicator for 
firms before and after shifting to export activity (column 4). All regressions include industry dummies 
(2-digit  CAE  rev.2.1).  Robust  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  ***,  **,  and  *  denote  statistical 
significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels, respectively. Tables with confidence intervals and further 
test statistics available from the authors upon request 
 